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IN T H E UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Appellant, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20100436-SC 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) provides this Court with jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the District Court erred in refusing to grant Mr, Gardner a 
temporary stay of execution pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-
8(2)(a)(iii), when, on May 4, 2010, Mr. Gardner filed a Petition under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
Issue 2: Whether the District Court erred in finding Mr. Gardner's Claims for 
post-conviction relief are time- and procedurally-barred under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
Issue 3: Whether the District Court erred in refusing to consider the "interests 
of justice" exception or the "good cause" exceptions to the time- and 
procedural-bars under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner is currently confined under a sentence of 
death pursuant to a Judgment entered on October 25, 1985, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County in case no. CR 8519007002. On April 23, 2010: Judge 
Robin Reese signed and issued an order for Mr. Gardner's execution for June 18, 2010. 
On May 4, 2010, Mr. Gardner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and 
Memorandum in Support, challenging his death sentencing on two grounds. (Addendum 
A, B). As grounds for relief, Mr. Gardner requested, inter alia, that the district court issue a 
temporary stay of the judgment of death pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 77-19-
8(2)(a)(iii). (Id. at 10). On May 5, 2010, Mr. Gardner filed a separate pleading requesting 
that the district court stay his execution. (Addendum C). 
On May 14, 2010, the State filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and supporting 
Memorandum, arguing that both of Mr. Gardner's claims are time- and procedurally-barred 
or, in the alternative, failed on the merits. (Addendum D, E). On May 20, 2010, the State 
filed an Opposition to Mr. Gardner's Motion to Stay his execution. (Addendum F). Mr. 
Gardner filed a Response to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 21., 2010. 
(Addendum G). No other pleadings were allowed by the district court pursuant to its 
scheduling orders issued on May 14, 2010, and May 18, 2010. (Addendum H, I). 
Oral argument was held before Judge Reese on May 27, 2010, at the end of which he 
verbally granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, but took Mr. Gardner's Motion to Stay Execution under 
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advisement. (Addendum J; Id. at 108-109). Mr. Gardner filed a Notice of Appeal that same 
day. (Addendum K). The following day, Judge Reese issued a written Memorandum 
Decision. (Addendum L). On June 1, 2010, Judge Reese issued another Memorandum 
Decision in which he denied Mr. Gardner's Motion to Stay Execution. (Addendum M). 
On June 3, 2010, Mr. Gardner filed an Amended Notice of Appeal in which he appealed 
both the decision dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the decision 
denying his Motion to Stay Execution. (Addendum N). 
This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 
Pursuant to this Court's order issued on June 3, 2010, Mr. Gardner incorporates the 
Statement of Relevant Facts from his Opening Brief in the Related Appeal, State of Utah v. 
Ronnie Lee Gardner, Case No. 20100345-SC, pages 3-17. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GRANT MR. 
GARDNER A TEMPORARY STAY OF EXECUTION 
In both his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and in a separate motion filed the 
following day, Mr. Gardner filed a Motion to Stay Execution pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 77-19-8(2)(a)(iii). (Addendum B at 10; Addendum C). In a 
Memorandum Decision issued on June 1, 2010, Judge Reese denied Mr. Gardner's motion, 
by concluding he could ignore the plain language of section 77-19-8-(2)(a)(iii) because, in 
his opinion, statutory compliance would be "absurd." (Addendum M at 3). Judge Reese 
erred in refusing to consider the plain language of the statute. "The proper interpretation 
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and application of a statute is a question of law which [an appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusion." State v. 
Anderson, 2007 UT App 304, 18, 169 P.3d 778 (quoting Gutierre^ v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 
914-15 (Utah 1998). 
In the related criminal action, Judge Reese set Mr. Gardner's execution date for June 
18, 2010. On May 4, 2010, Mr. Gardner filed a Petition under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, Utah Code Annotated section 78B-9-101 et seq. Section 77-19-8(2)(a) 
states, in clear and unambiguous language: "A court of competent jurisdiction shall issue a 
temporary stay of judgment of death when: . . . (iii) the person sentenced to death files for 
postconviction relief under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act." The 
language is clear that Judge Reese should have issued a temporary stay of Mr. Gardner's 
currently-set execution date on the day he filed a his petition. Judge Reese erroneously 
refused to do so and this Court, as a court with competent jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal of Mr. Gardner's post-conviction proceeding, should issue the statutorily-mandate 
stay. 
When interpreting a statute, the Court must "look first to its plain language to 
determine its meaning." Anderson, 2007 UT App 304, at Tfll (citing Utah State Tax Comm'n 
v. Stevenson, 2002 UT 84, ^[32, 150 P.3d 521). Although Judge Reese acknowledged the plain 
meaning of section 77-19-8(2)(a)(iii), mandating that he shall issue a temporary stay of 
execution upon the filing of a post-conviction petition, he reasoned that he could ignore the 
plain meaning because the plain meaning of the statute would '"embrace a resul t . . . so 
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absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature.'" (Addendum M at 2-3 
(quoting Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ]fl2, 223 P.3d 1128 (internal quotation omitted))). 
Judge Reese reasoned that the plain reading of the statute would allow a death-sentenced 
individual to indefinitely stay his execution. (Addendum M at 3-4). Judge Reese's 
interpretation of the statute was incorrect and, moreover, his fears of indefinitely forestalled 
executions was unfounded. 
First, Judge Reese's "task [was] to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to 
correct or revise them. When the words are clear, however incongruous they may appear in 
policy application, [the court must] interpret them as written, leaving to the legislature the 
task of making corrections when warranted." State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, ^ }9,150 P.3d 
540. The language of section 77-19-8(2)(a)(iii) is clear on its face. The legislature directed 
the district court to issue a temporary stay of execution upon the filing of a petition for 
post-conviction relief. Judge Reese erred by ignoring this mandate. This Court, now as the 
court of competent jurisdiction, should enter a temporary stay pending the resolution of 
this appeal. 
Furthermore, Judge Reese's fears of a never-ending stay based on a risk that death-
sentenced individual could continually file petitions on the eve of an execution date is 
unfounded. Judge Reese is correct that by issuing a temporary stay, the result is that the 
stay "would effectively vacate the previously scheduled date for executing the sentence of 
death." (Addendum M at 3). Thus, in this case for instance, the required temporary stay of 
execution would effectively vacate the currently-set execution date of June 18, 2010. 
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However, at the conclusion of the post-conviction proceeding (only assuming the petition is 
not granted), the district court would then hold a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
section 77-19-9, to set a new execution date. 
At that time, under section 77-19-9, Judge Reese could then "make an order 
requiring . . . that the judgment is executed on a specified day, which may not be fewer than 30 
nor more than 60 days after the court's order . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-9(2) (emphasis 
added). Thus, at that time, Judge Reese could set the execution date for 30 days after the 
section 77-19-9 hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-201 would prohibit Mr. Gardner from 
applying for post-conviction relief "within 30 days prior to the date set for execution of a 
capital sentence, unless the grounds for application are based on facts or circumstances 
which developed or first became known with that period of time." Thus, Mr. Gardner, 
facing a set execution date in 30 days, could not even apply for post-conviction relief. 
Judge Reese's hypothetical fear that the petitioner's filing of the petition, even within 
30 days, would vacate the set execution date and void section 78B-9-201fs prohibition is 
unfounded. Section 78B-9-201 prohibits a petitioner from even applying for, or allowing 
the court to entertain, a petition filed within 30 days. Therefore, such late-filed petition 
could not require the court to issue a temporary stay under section 77-19-8(2)(a)(iii). 
Furthermore, any hypothetical or remotely possible fear that a petitioner could file a 
petition within 30 days is not a reason for a court to ignore its statutory duty. Any remote 
possibility of a petitioner abusing the process, which is not an issue in this case, is an issue 
for the legislature to correct. "[T]f a statute is infirm, 'amendments to correct the inequities 
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should be made by the legislature and not by judicial interpretation." Masich v. United States 
Smelting Ref. <&Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 625 (Utah 1948). 
The Court "must be guided by the law as it is . . . . When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction." Hanchettv. Burbidge, 202 P. 377, 379-80 (Utah 1921). The language of 
section 77-19-8(2) is clear and unambiguous. In considering the plain language of a statute, 
courts must "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each 
term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Arredondo v. Avis Rent A CarSys., 
Inc., 2001 UT 29, f 12, 24 P.3d 928 (internal quotation omitted). Judge Reese erred in 
refusing to grant a temporary stay. 
This Court, now as the court of competent jurisdiction, should issue a temporary 
stay of Mr. Gardner's execution date pending the resolution of this post-conviction matter. 
The legal and procedural issues presented in this case are complex and the State has, in the 
district court, argued that this Court should overrule decades of constitutionally-based 
precedent. For these reasons, this Court should issue a temporary stay to consider fully this 
manner. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING MR. GARDNER'S 
CLAIMS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
In his Petition, Mr. Gardner asserted two claims: (1) that his execution will violate 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal and Utah State Constitutions 
because no Utah state court has ever been presented with or considered the full and 
complete evidence of Mr. Gardner's mitigating circumstances; and (2) that his execution 
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after almost a quarter of a century on death row violates the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Judge Reese 
dismissed Mr. Gardner's petition by determining that the facts supporting his claims 
became known to Mr. Gardner in September 1999, during the evidentiary hearing held 
before Magistrate Judge Alba in Mr. Gardner's federal habeas case, and therefore were both 
time- and procedurally barred under the PCRA. 
Under Rule 65C(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "if the court comments on 
the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly determine whether 
that claim is independently precluded under Section 78B-9-106." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b). 
Under section 78B-9-106, a claim is precluded if the claim "could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or . . . is barred by the limitation 
period established in Section 78B-9-107." U.C.A. § 78B-9-106(d), (e). 
However, Utah precedent establishes that both inquiries require this Court to 
consider whether the "interests of justice" would excuse a late filing and whether "good 
cause" would excuse an otherwise procedurally barred claim. Although Mr. Gardner 
maintains that both of his claims are neither time nor procedurally barred under Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 65C or the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") even without a 
judicial inquiry into excuses of such bars, Judge Reese's legal conclusion that recent 
amendments to both the Rule and the PCRA abolished any common law interpretation 
would cause both the Rule and the PCRA to run afoul of the Utah Constitution. Thus, as 
will be explained below, a reviewing court must interpret Rule 65C and the PCRA to 
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include the common law exception which are based on constitutional guarantees as set 
forth under this Court's precedent. 
A. Mr. Gardner's Due Process and Equal Protection Claims are Neither 
Time- Nor Procedurally-Barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act 
In his May 28, 2010, Memorandum Decision, Judge Reese dismissed Mr. Gardner's 
Due Process and Equal Protection Claims as both time- and procedurally- barred under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. (Addendum L at 15-20). The Court reviews an appeal 
from an order dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness 
without deference to the lower court's conclusions of law. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, 
f 13,156 P.3d 739; Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,1f4, 43 P.3d 467. 
Under subsection (2)(e), Mr. Gardner's cause of action accrued on "the date on 
which pie] knew or should have know, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary 
facts on which the [claim] is based." U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). Under the PCRA, a 
petitioner is precluded from raising a claim that "was raised or addressed in any previous 
request for post-conviction relief. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(d). Judge Reese 
concluded that Mr. Gardner knew the facts supporting his claims in September 1999, when 
petitioner presented his mitigating evidence at the federal evidentiary hearing. (Addendum 
L at 20). Judge Reese reasoned that Mr. Gardner only had until September 2000 to timely 
raise his claims and that Mr. Gardner failed to raise the claim in his successive petition filed 
in May 2000. 
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However, as Mr. Gardner argued in his Response to the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, he only first "learned o f the facts supporting his claim, for purposes of the 
PCRA, on June 19, 2009, when the federal court of appeals refused to apply a de novo 
standard of review (which had been conceded by the State) to his argument that he was 
prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, or March 8, 2010, 
when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. That was the first time Mr. 
Gardner learned of the fact that no court, ultimately reviewing the matter, would give his 
case in mitigation a full and fair consideration. 
Judge Reese, however, dismissed the Tenth Circuit's decision to not review Mr. 
Gardner's mitigating circumstances de novo as the mere "legal consequences" of the federal 
court's decision, and not the evidentiary fact on which Mr. Gardner's claims are based. 
(Addendum L at 18). For support, Judge Reese cited federal district courts' interpretations 
of the federal habeas statute of limitations, which states that the limitations period may 
accrue on "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 
However, unlike the Utah statute, which states that the limitations period accrues on the 
date "the evidentiary facts on which the [claim] is based," the federal statute requires accrual 
on the date the "factual predicate" of the claim is discovered. Thus, while the federal 
statute requires a mere "predicate" to initiate the limitations period, the Utah state statute 
requires all "evidentiary facts on which the [claim] is based." 
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As the Seventh Circuit recognized, "[ujnlike some state systems, which start the time only 
when a party knows (or should recognise) that a legal wrong has been done, federal statutes use 
objective indicators as trigger . . . Time begins [under the federal statute] when the prisoner 
knows (or through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner 
recognizes their legal significance." Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added). Judge Reese erred in relying on federal district court case law 
interpreting a federal statute that uses the phrase "factual predicate." Section 78B-9-
107(2)(e) states that a claim such as Mr. Gardner's accrues on the date he learned of the 
evidentiary facts to support his claim, which includes the date on which he learned of the 
injury he suffered by the Utah courts' refusal to consider his full case in mitigation-that is 
on the date he learned that even the federal courts would refuse to consider his case in 
mitigation de novo. 
To support his claims for relief, Mr. Gardner had to prove an injury to him from the 
constitutional violation. The "evidentiary facts" to support his claim of injury could not 
have been known until the federal courts ultimately decided that he would not receive a full 
and fair hearing with a de novo standard of review. Certainly, the State, which argued as 
late as February 2009, when it presented its arguments before the federal court of appeals, 
that Mr. Gardner was entitled to such review precisely because he was denied funds in state 
post-conviction, cannot contest that the injury component of the claims could have been 
proved in state court as long as Mr. Gardner received a full and fair hearing in federal court. 
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Mr. Gardner could not have learned of the evidentiary facts until the federal court of 
appeals refused to consider his mitigating evidence de novo in support of his underlying 
claim that he received ineffective assistance at sentencing. Thus, Mr. Gardner's Due 
Process and Equal Protection Claims are timely under the PCRA and not procedurally 
barred because he could not have asserted these claims in an earlier petition. 
B. Mr. Gardner's Claim, that his Execution Will Violate the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clauses under the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, section 9, of the Utah 
Constitution, is Neither Time- Nor Procedurally-Barred under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
Judge Reese dismissed Mr. Gardner's 'Lackey'1 claim as time- and procedurally-
barred. The Court reviews an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition for 
post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions of 
law. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^ [13,156 P.3d 739; Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, [^4, 43 
P.3d 467. 
As with Mr. Gardner's Due Process and Equal Protection claims, Judge Reese 
reasoned that Mr. Gardner knew of the facts supporting his claim in September 1999, when 
the mitigating circumstances were developed at the federal evidentiary hearing. (Addendum 
L at 23-24). Judge Reese reasoned that passage of time, which extended Mr. Gardner's 
time on death row year after year, was merely "cumulative." Judge Reese further reasoned 
that Mr. Gardner's argument that his execution would serve no retributive purpose is based 
on facts discovered during the federal evidentiary hearing in September 1999-when Mr. 
lSee Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
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Gardner developed the mitigating circumstances which calls the jury's death verdict into 
question. 
However, as recently recognized by United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens, 
the relevant time giving rise to the cause of action for Mr. Gardner's Lackey claim is the 
time at which the court signs the warrant of execution that will actually lead to Mr. 
Gardner's death. See Johnson p. Bredesen, 130 S.Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) ("I am persuaded that a Lackey claim, like a claim that one is 
mentally incompetent to be executed, should at the very least, not accrue until an execution 
date is set") (citing Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368,1371-72 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., 
dissenting); cf. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007)). Furthermore, Mr. Gardner 
had no reason to believe that he would fail to get relief in federal court based on the 
development of this evidence until the federal court denied his habeas petition, and the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 8, 2010. Therefore, the aspect of 
Mr. Gardner's argument that his execution serves no retributive purpose because no jury 
has ever heard the compelling mitigating evidence developed in federal court that would call 
for a life sentence (as laid forth extensively in Claim One of his petition) is timely presented 
to the state court. 
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C. Even if Mr. Gardner's Claims are Time- and/or Procedurally Barred 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the District Court was 
required to consider whether the "Interests of Justice" and "Good 
Cause" Exceptions Excused Such Bars and the District Court Erred 
by Failing to Consider these Exceptions 
In dismissing Mr. Gardner's claims, Judge Reese refused to consider the "interests of 
justice" exception to the time-bar or the "good cause" exception to the procedural-bar. 
(Addendum L at 27-29). Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation involve 
conclusions of law that the Court reviews for correctness, granting no deference to the 
district court. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, TJ7, 158 P.3d 540 (citations omitted). 
1. This Court must still consider whether the "interests of justice " excuse any 
untimely filing notwithstanding the 2008 amendments to the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ("PCRA") 
The PCRA establishes a one year limitation "after the cause of action has accrued." 
U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(l). A cause of action is deemed to have accrued on, inter alia, "the date 
on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based[.]" Id § 78B-9-107(2)(e). Prior to the 2008 
amendments, a petitioner was "not eligible for relief. . . upon any ground that. . . .[was] 
barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107." U.C.A. § 78-35a-
106(l)(e) (repealed). As with the current statute, the former PCRA entitled a petitioner to 
"relief only if the petition [was] filed within one year after the cause of action [had] 
accrued." Id. § 78-35a-107(l) (repealed). However, the former PCRA included a statutory 
exception that, if satisfied, would excuse an untimely filing. Under this exception, "if the 
court f[ound] that interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file 
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within the time limitations." Id. § 78-35a-107(3). During the 2008 legislative session, the 
interests of justice language was removed from the PCRA and replaced with equitable 
tolling provisions which toll the limitations period "for any period during which the 
petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United 
State Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity." U.C.A. § 78B-9-107(3). The 
change went into effect on May 5, 2008. 
Prior to the 2008 amendments, this Court held that a trial court "presented with an 
untimely post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice exception before 
disposing of the petition . . . [and] has no discretion to grant relief on an untimely . . . 
petition if the 'interests of justice' do not so require." Johnson v. State, 2006 UT 21, f^ 16,134 
P.3d 1133. On the other hand, if the trial court makes specific findings in support of the 
interests of justice exception, then the untimeliness of the successive petition must be 
excused. See id. at If 17. "An analysis of what constitutes an exception in the 'interests of 
justice' should involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim 
and the reason for an untimely filing." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, \ 16,123 P.3d 400. 
However, it was not necessarily required that both prongs of the test be satisfied. "[W]e 
expect that the district court will give appropriate weight to each of [these] factors 
according to the circumstances of a particular case."Ii. 
Although the 2008 legislation removed the "interests of justice" language from the 
PCRA, this Court must still consider whether the interests of justice excuses an untimely 
filing. The interests of justice exception, although codified in the former PCRA, was based 
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on Utah common law. In Burnett v. New York Central RK, 380 U.S. 424 (1965), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that: 
Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. 
Such statutes "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of 
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even 
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to the adversary on notice to defend 
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in 
time come to prevail over the right to prosecute them." . . . The policy of repose, 
designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed, however, where the interests of justice 
require vindication of the plaintiffs rights. 
Id. at 428 (quoting Orderojr Railroad'Telegrapherv. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49 (1944) (emphasis added)). Thus, an interests of justice exception must be read into 
the current PCRA. To disregard this exception, which both relies on and guarantees 
judicial discretion, would otherwise conflict with sections of the Utah State Constitution, 
and this Court's obligation to "avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant 
constitutional mandates." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,1009 (Utah 1995); see also Provo City 
Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990) ("We have a duty to construe statutes to 
avoid constitutional conflicts.") 
To the extent the current PCRA does not allow an interests of justice exception to 
an otherwise inflexible time bar, the statute is unconstitutional under the Utah 
Constitution's open courts provision in article I, section 11, as well as the separation of 
powers provision in article V, section 1. See Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998) 
(finding former section 78-12-25(3)'s catch-all four-year statute of limitation 
unconstitutional because of lack of flexibility); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1368 & n.18 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding former 90-day statute of limitations unconstitutional because 
it was too rigid and did not provide for judicial discretion). Indeed, the former PCRA's one 
year statute of limitation, with the statutory interests of justice exception, was enacted to 
alleviate the concerns in Currier. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 251 n.3. 
Judge Reese reasoned that the 2008 PCRA time limitation is not inflexible because it 
requires a petitioner to diligently seek out the evidentiary facts supporting his claim and file 
a petition within one year of that date. (Addendum L at 26-27). However, under Julian and 
Currier, it was not the date of the a claim's accrual which satisfied the constitutional 
requirement for judicial flexibility. Utah Code Annotated section 78B-9-107(2)(e) is just as 
inflexible as the statute at issue in Currier and Julian. Furthermore, it is completely unclear 
where Judge Reese supported his assertion that "the equitable tolling provisions further 
mitigate against any alleged inflexibility." (Addendum L at 27). Under the 2008 PCRA as 
written, there are no exceptions other than the limited statutory exceptions under U.C.A. § 
78B-9-107(3) and (4), under the State's and Judge Reese's interpretation, there is no 
provision for equitable tolling. Thus, as written, the 2008 PCRA is inflexible and the only 
way to remedy any constitutional infirmity is for this Court to imply an "interests of justice" 
exception into the statutory time bar. 
In contrast to Judge Reese's view, under federal case law, the courts retain the power 
to decide on, on a case-by-case basis, whether the strict statutory time limitations may be 
equitably tolled, thereby permitting petitioners to file petitions beyond the statutory time 
period. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 225, 235 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[TJf 
17 
the petitioner is affirmatively misled, either the court or by the State, equitable tolling might 
well be appropriate."). The fact that a death sentence has been imposed is a factor which 
should be taken into account by the court in determining whether to apply equitable tolling. 
See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3rd Or. 2001). In Menkes, this Court has similarly 
applied heightened protections to capital defendants in post-conviction proceedings. See 
Menkes v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81,1J82,150 P.3d 480. 
Thus, even if this Court were to look to the federal habeas law for guidance, the 
federal courts retain the right and power to exercise discretion in determining whether to 
apply absolutely the strict provisions of a legislatively enacted statute of limitations. Here, 
because the State affirmatively argued throughout the federal proceedings that a de novo 
standard of review applied, equitable tolling must permit the filing of this petition even if 
the Court agrees with Judge Reese's interpretation of the statutory language on "evidentiary 
facts." 
The reason for an exception to the time bar, allowing judicial discretion, is due to 
the this Court's continued reference to the "writ" as "the precious safeguard of personal 
liberty[.]" Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029,1033 (Utah 1989). "Quintessential^, the Writ 
belongs to the judicial branch of government" and "the writ of habeas corpus is one of the 
most important of all judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty." Id. at 1034. 
In Julian, in striking the application of the "inflexible" four-year catch-all statute of 
limitations, this Court relied on this language from Hurst as well as the Utah Constitution's 
provision that, "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, 
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in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it." Utah Const, art. I, § 5. 
Specifically, this Court, in Julian, stated: 
Hence, the legislature may not impose restrictions which limit the writ 
as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the constitution. As we 
have stated, "[T]he separation of powers provision, Article V, Section 1 of 
the Utah Constitution, requires, and the Open Courts Provision of the 
Declaration of Rights, Article I, Section 11, presupposes, a judicial 
department armed with process sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch 
of government." Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1033. Thus in striking section 78-12-
31.1 as unconstitutional, the court of appeals aptly noted that the statute 
"remove[d] flexibility and discretion from state judicial procedure, thereby 
diminishing the court's ability to guarantee fairness and equity in particular 
cases." Currier, 862 P.2d at 1368 n.18. 
Julian, 966 P.2d at 253. To that end, this Court further held that the "proper consideration 
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of 
justice. It necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied 
to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 254. Thus, the only way to remedy an otherwise 
unconstitutional and inflexible time bar is for this Court to consider the interests of justice 
exception. 
In this case, Mr. Gardner is entided to the interests of justice exception for both of 
his claims. The reason for any untimely filing is due to Mr. Gardner's belief, with the 
State's concession, that he would be allowed a full and fair consideration of his mitigating 
evidence de novo by the federal court. Consideration of this claim requires a review of the 
meritoriousness of Mr. Gardner's claims, discussed infra, Section III (referencing Mr. 
Gardner's Opening and Reply Briefs from his related appeal). Thus, even if untimely, this 
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Court should consider Mr. Gardner's claims on the merits, find that he interests of justice 
exception applies to excuse his untimely filing, and grant Mr. Gardner relief. 
2. Similarly, this Court must still consider whether "good cause " exists to allow his 
otherwise barred claims 
Under U.C.A. § 78B-9-106, "A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter 
upon any ground that: . . . ( b ) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;. . . [or] (d) was 
raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, 
but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief.. ." Id. § 78B-9-
106(l)(b), (d). Under the 2010 amendment to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, "if the court 
comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first clearly and expressly 
determine whether that claim is independentiy precluded under Section 78B-9-106." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(b). In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judge, the 
State contended that "[n]o exceptions apply" to this statute and rule (Addendum E at 37). 
The State's argument is wrong and should be rejected. Judge Reese agreed, reasoning that, 
"[i]n light of the recent rule and statutory changes, the Court is not required to consider the 
merits of [Mr. Gardner's] claims pursuant to the common law good cause exceptions." 
(Addendum L at 29). 
The PCRA's procedural bar codifies the common law. See Gardner v. Holden, 888 
P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) (Gardner!) ("Issues that could and should have raised on direct 
appeal, but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent 
unusual circumstances."). With respect to claims not previously raised, this Court lias 
"consistendy recognized exceptions to [the procedural bar] rule in "unusual circumstances' 
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where 'good cause' excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the claim earlier." Tillman v. State, 
2005 UT 56, If 20, 128 P.3d 1123 (citing Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036). 
Mr. Gardner acknowledges that the "unusual circumstances" exception was 
developed when Rule 65C(c) provided that, "Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent [post-conviction] proceedings except 
for good cause shown" (emphasis added), and that under the 2010 amendments to Rule, the 
"good cause shown" language was deleted. However, the "unusual circumstances" based 
on "good cause" exception is based on the common law and, as explained in the discussion 
regarding the "interests of justice" exception to the time bar, the legislature is powerless to 
strip the judiciary of its right to oversee its power to issue the writ, therefore, the exception 
remains viable. 
In Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3,151 P.3d 968, (Gardner IV), this Court stated: 
long been our lawQ that a procedural default is not always determinative of a 
collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not 
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony with 
constitutional standards. Therefore, even where a claim of error could have 
been raised earlier, post-conviction relief may be available in those "rare 
cases" or "unusual circumstances" where "an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred" that 
would make it "unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue. 
Id. at % 17, 151 P.3d 968; see also Medelv. State, 2008 UT 32, ^[20, 184 P.3d 1226. 
At oral argument held before the district court, State's counsel argued that Gardner 
was wrong and should be overruled. (Addendum J at 34). This Court should reject the 
State's argument to depart from its well-reasoned and recent precedent. Those asking the 
Court to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden. See State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 
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421, 427 (Utah 1986). While the doctrine of stare decisis does not inexorably bind a court 
of last resort to its own precedent, the Court should follow its own previously established 
rule of law "unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer 
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by 
departing from precedent." State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). 
The State cannot meet its substantial burden. This Court's judicial authority over 
the Great Writ is well grounded in constitutional authority. The State's attempt to 
circumvent this authority through legislative amendments does not show that the Court's 
prior proclamations were "originally erroneous" or "no longer sound." Indeed, as the 
legislature attempts to strip this Court of its ultimate authority to consider a Petitioner's 
claims of extraordinary circumstances only shows the need for the Court's judicial authority 
to ensure a constitutionally necessary balance and separation of powers. 
The State wrongly cites the advisory committee note to the 2010 amendment to Rule 
65C as evidence that this Court "has cembrace[d]' the PCRA as the law governing post 
conviction review," and erroneously argues to the Court that the rule amendment supports 
its argument that, "the judiciary must exercise its 'special role' within the confines of the 
PCRA, including its time- and procedural-bars." (Addendum E at 39 n.6). Advisory 
committee comments to rules adopted are not authoritative. Burns v. State, 2006 UT 14, \\ 8 
n.6, 133 P.3d 370. While the Court may "generally consider the comments a fairly reliable 
indicator of [its] intent in adopting the rules because the comments to the rules were 
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available to this court at the time of their adoption/' D.J. Investment Group, L.L.C. v. 
Dae/Westbrook, L.L.C, 2006 UT 62, [^14, 147 P.3d 414 (citing Burns, 2006 UT, at [^18 n.6), it 
is not required to do so.2 
However, in considering the State's argument that the advisory committee notes 
must be considered as an indication of the Utah Supreme Court's embracement of abdicating 
its common law and constitutional duty to oversee post-conviction relief, it must be noted 
that the September 23, 2009, Minutes from the Advisory Committee (Attachment B), 
during which the amendment was approved, reveal that: 
Judge [Derrek P.] Pullan questioned representatives form the Attorney 
General's office whether the Attorney General is taking that Courts have no 
common law authority to set aside a conviction. Judge Pullan sought 
assurances that the Court's discretion to act in egregious circumstances is 
preserved under the proposed amendment. Mr. Brunker and Mr. Torgeson 
assured judge Pullan that it was not the intention of the Attorney General to foreclose the 
Court from granting relief outside the PCRA in appropriate circumstances. Judge 
Pullan emphasized his view that the court must have the ability to correct 
egregious injustices through the writ process and indicated his support for the 
proposed amendment only so long as that ability is preserved to the judiciary. 
Judge Pullan was assured by those representatives of the Attorney General's 
office present that courts would retain that ability. 
Minutes, Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Sept. 9, 2009, at 3 (emphasis added) (Addendum O). 
In any event, a court rule must still be interpreted so as to not conflict with a 
constitutional provision. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 425-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
2Pursuant to Utah Constitution Article VIII, section 4, the Legislature retained the power 
to amend the Rule of Procedure. The process for rulemaking is outlined in Chapter 11 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Pursuant to Rule 11-105, the Supreme Court adopted the 
2010 amendment to Rule 65C, but there is no where evidence that this Court "embrace[d]" the 
limit on their judicial authority over the writ. 
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(considering defendant's argument that Utah R. Crim. P. 7(c) conflicts with the 
constitution). Thus, the common law exception, based on provisions of the Utah 
Constitution, as articulated by the supreme court in Hurst, survived the 2008 amendments. 
In Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ^{15, 94 P.3d 263 {Gardner III), the Supreme Court 
clarified that the common law exception "retainfed its] independent constitutional 
significance^]" Thus, these exceptions can be asserted by a petitioner raising successive 
post-conviction claims regardless of whether the exception has been included in the PCRA. 
The Gardner 11 court unequivocally reaffirmed its duty to "exercise [its] constitutionally 
vested authority . . . to prevent the unlawful, improper incarceration or execution of 
innocent individuals . . . " Id. at {^18, 94 P.3d 263. This Court again restated this principle in 
Gardner TV, that "[a]s a result, it is possible for a successive post-conviction claim to be 
procedurally barred under the PCRA and yet receive substantive review on its merits under 
our independent cgood cause' common law exceptions." Gardner TV, 2007 UT 3, at ]f20, 
151 P.3d 968. Similar to Mr. Gardner's argument that a statutory abolishment of the 
interests of justice exception would violate the Utah Constitution, the attempt to abolish 
judicial discretion to excuse a statutory procedural bar, via the 2010 amendments, would 
also violate the Open Courts and Separation of Powers provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. Julian, 966 P.2d at 253. 
If, as the State concedes, this Court retains the power to address the merits of 
otherwise barred claims in "appropriate circumstances," or in cases of "egregious 
injustices," Mr. Gardner's case requires merits review. Mr. Gardner remains the sole capital 
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defendant in the State of Utah who did not receive either the benefit of appointed counsel 
and funds for an investigation and experts, or the application of de novo review by the 
highest federal court to consider the mitigation evidence.3 This Court can only correct this 
injustice by deciding the merits of the claims raised in the instant petition. 
In this case, if the Court does affirm Judge Reese's decision that Mr. Gardner's 
claims are procedurally barred, such a procedural bar is excused because (1) Mr. Gardner 
has good cause for not asserting the claims in a prior petition, that Mr. Gardner believed, 
with the State's concession, that he would be allowed a full and fair consideration of his 
mitigating evidence de novo by the federal court;4 (2) his claims are not frivolous or 
"facially implausible", see Discussion, infra, section III (referencing Mr. Gardner's Opening 
and Reply Briefs in his related appeal); and (3) neither claim was withheld from a previous 
petition due to tactical or strategic reasons, (Addendum P). 
3In its decision, the Tenth Circuit twice noted the significance of de novo review, yet 
refused to consider whether Mr. Gardner would be entitled to relief under such review. See 
Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 878-79, 883 (10th Or. 2009), cert denied, 130 S.Ct. 1737 
(2010). 
4Under the common law, this Court identified five "good cause" common law 
exception to the procedural bar rule, three of which were later codified either by statute or 
procedural rule. These common law exceptions included: "(1) the denial of a constitutional 
right pursuant to new law that is, or might be retroactive, (2) new facts not previously known 
which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change the outcome of the 
trial, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, (4) the illegality of a 
sentence, [and] (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the 
writ." Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. Prior to the 2010 amendment, the this Court made clear that 
the list of common law exception set forth in Hurst, was not an exhaustive list. See Gardner 
IV, 2007 UT 3, at fL8,151 P.3d 968 ("We later clarified that this list of 'good cause' 
exceptions is not exhaustive."). 
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III. MR. GARDNER CLAIMS, IF HEARD ON THE MERITS, WOULD 
WARRANT A NEW SENTENCING HEARING OR THE IMPOSITION 
OF A LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE 
Pursuant to this Court's Order issued on June 3, 2010, Mr. Gardner incorporates the 
Arguments from his Opening and Reply Briefs in the Related Appeal, State of Utah v. Ronnie 
Lee Gardner, Case No. 20100345-SC. Opening Brief at pp. 21-50; Reply Brief at pp. 6-25. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should either remand the matter to the district 
court for consideration of the merits of the claims, or in the alternative, after consideration 
of the merits, reverse the issuance of the warrant and enter an order imposing a life 
sentence for the killing of Michael Burdell. Regardless of the Court's ruling, this Court 
should find Judge Reese erred by refusing to grant Mr. Gardner a temporary stay of 
execution pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-19-2(a)(iii), and, as the current court of competent 
jurisdiction, enter a temporary stay of execution pending the resolution of this matter. 
SUBMITTED this 7th day of June, 2010. 
^ / ( N D R E W PARNES 
MEGAN MORIARTY 
THERESE M. DAY 
Attorneys for Appeallant 
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